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I would like to thank those who took part in the discussion for their comments 
about my work, which were very generous indeed, and for their questions. I will try 
to answer them in the very circumscribed limits of  my abilities and knowledge.  
1. I will begin with an observation made by Lina Bolzoni about a passage from my 
essay “Some Queries Addressed to Myself,” where, after stressing the link between 
my research into Inquisition trials and the political and social context of  Italy in the 
seventies, I wrote: 
But there was another element, which I did not realize until many years later: in the 
emotional identification with the victims of  persecution, and in the impulse to study 
them, there was an unconscious projection of  my Jewish identity, which the 
persecution had reinforced.1 
Lina Bolzoni cites the passage and comments: “There is a general trend: after the 
universalism of  the sixties, the dimension of  identity – of  different identities – 
became stronger.” She then followed her observation with an invitation to rethink 
historic research, giving it “a new ethical dimension.” 
I will not dwell on this invitation now, but rather on the spread, in recent decades, 
of  a politics (and historiography) of  identity. Such phenomena are very well known. 
Would it be right to insert my belated awareness within this general trend? To be 
frank, I do not think it would. A more or less direct connection between the 
historian’s experience as an individual and his or her approach to research can, it 
seems to me, be taken for granted. In my case, I retrospectively gained the 
impression that this connection operated in a subterranean and therefore much 
stronger fashion. This meant that for many years I dealt with themes which had a 
metaphoric rather than a literal relation with my identity (a term to which I will 
return shortly): I did not study Jews, but victims of  inquisitional persecution such as 
witches or heretics. The repressed element surfaced slowly, as I tried to explain 
recently in a public dialogue with Paul Holdengräber at the New York Public Library. 
The title I had proposed – “Being Jewish, Becoming Jewish” – implied a polemic, 
then developed in the course of  the dialogue, towards the notion that identity is 
something which inexorably orients the behaviour of  individuals and populations, on 
a more or less broad scale.2 In the interminable discussions on identity – Italian, 
French, Jewish, European, and so on – the term “identity” is used as a weapon to 
separate insiders from outsiders.3 
                                                 
1 C. Ginzburg, “Some Queries Addressed to Myself,” in Carlo Ginzburg 2010 Balzan Prize for European 
History (1400-1700), excerpt (revised) from Premi Balzan 2010 (Milan 2010), pp. 9–17, especially p. 10.  
2 http://www.nypl.org/audiovideo/live-nypl-carlo-ginzburg 
3 I had touched on these issues at Bordeaux in 2012, in receiving an honorary degree from the 
Université Michel de Montaigne, and then in the conference that followed: “Peut-on se passer de la 
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This notion of  identity has always been foreign to me, as confirmed by the flip 
side of  my late realization. The awareness of  the repressed individual roots of  my 
emotive identification with the victims of  the Inquisition was accompanied by the 
discovery of  an intellectual contiguity, also repressed (for wholly different reasons), 
with the Inquisitors.4 In place of  an ego that displays its real or presumed identity 
like an immutable brand, I found myself  faced with a mobile, plural ego, the point of  
intersection of  different and sometimes contradictory senses of  belonging.5 What am 
I talking about, an exception or the rule? 
2. As seen, I began with a private (and even unconscious) experience relating to 
research and ended up cautiously proposing a definition of  the ego that might be 
extended (though this remains entirely to be seen) to any individual. Can this 
propensity for generalization on the basis of  a specific case be tied in with the 
“universalism” of  the sixties, evoked, in vaguely nostalgic terms, by Lina Bolzoni? 
Certainly not. The attempt to generalize a particular case (an issue I will address 
shortly) cannot be a surrogate of  more or less universalistic ideologies. Research 
cannot be a surrogate of  politics (or of  ideology), even though it often feeds off  it. 
This distinction between different levels should also be stressed with regard to the 
objection made by Perry Anderson and picked up on by Lucio Biasiori. Once again, 
the discussion focuses on the relationship between norm and exception. 
“Ontologically,” Anderson says, it is the norm that defines the exception; the 
opposite is not always the case. Of  course. But what I said about norm and 
exception did not refer to ontology, but to epistemology. It is on the level of  
epistemology that the exception proves to be richer than the norm, in that it refers,  
implicitly or explicitly, to it (while the opposite is not true). 
Even an exceptional individual like the miller Menocchio had experiences in 
common, to a greater or lesser degree, with other individuals of  his time: working, 
listening to a sermon, learning to read, etc. Here we are moving close to the notion 
of  exceptional/normal formulated by Edoardo Grendi, and then picked up on by 
Carlo Poni and myself.6 Certainly, the exceptional nature of  Menocchio was not just 
documentary (the inhabitants of  his village considered him strange, but not off  his 
head). And yet that exceptionality would have remained unknown if  it had not been 
transmitted by an exceptional document. 
Grendi’s “effective oxymoron” appeared in an essay dating to 1977, a year after 
The Cheese and the Worms.7 Grendi talked about “micro-analysis”; its synonym, “micro-
history,” would become widely used soon afterwards. Both terms referred to the 
analytic perspective of  research, not to the real or symbolic dimensions of  its subject. 
                                                                                                                                     
Michel de Montaigne Bordeaux 3. 
4 C. Ginzburg, “The Inquisitor as Anthropologist,” in Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method (Baltimore 
1989), pp. 156–64.  
5 C. Ginzburg, The Bond of  Shame, in Passionen. Objekte – Schauplätze – Denkstile, edited by C. Caduff, A.-
K. Reulecke, U. Vedder (Munich 2010), pp. 19–26.  
6 C. Ginzburg and C. Poni, “Il nome e il come: scambio ineguale e mercato storiografico,” Quaderni 
storici 40 (1979), pp. 181–90. English translation: “The Name and the Game: Unequal Exchange and 
the Historical Marketplace,” in Microhistory and the Lost People of  Europe, edited by E. Muir and G. 
Ruggiero (Baltimore 1991), pp. 2–10. 
7 E. Grendi, “Micro-analisi e storia sociale,” Quaderni storici 35 (1977), pp. 506–20, especially p. 512.  
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It is significant that Grendi, to illustrate his point, posed a question about a large-
scale phenomenon: “Has industrialization distinguished or standardized social 
structures?” His answer was that this is a problem for comparative history, to be 
tackled through a series of  case-studies “before then, possibly, considering 
typologies.” 8 
Grendi was perhaps alluding here to Max Weber’s Idealtypen: a discussion of  such 
an eventuality would be very far-reaching. In any case, one can agree with what 
Timpanaro wrote in the passage singled out by Biasiori: “micro-history,” he said, 
“should certainly not stifle the need for a broader cultural or political-social history, 
but nor is it simply a means for those vaster syntheses.” In other words, “micro-
history” has a validity of  its own. But the relation between the two perspectives does 
exist, and it unfolds (as Grendi was quick to point out) through comparative history. 
3. Lucio Biasiori observed that, through the reflection on anomaly, the theme of  
comparative history has gradually become increasingly present in my works. One of  
these, still unpublished, bears out Biasiori’s view. Another point he mentions, 
however, requires some qualification, when he says that I was born “within a 
tradition that developed almost entirely outside of  Soviet communism.” This is true, 
but that “almost” touches on an issue which cannot be avoided: my relationship (and 
that of  a significant part of  my generation) with the Italian Communist Party. I voted 
for the party for as long as it existed, even though I never joined it (or ever thought 
of  doing so). I grew up in an environment marked by the presence of  Communists, 
and above all of  ex-Communists, who left the party at different stages and for 
different reasons. First and foremost, my mother (in 1953); then a number of  people 
who made a deep impact on my formation, such as Felice Balbo (in 1953) and Italo 
Calvino (in 1956). All of  them worked (or had worked, as in the case of  Balbo) for 
the publishing house which my father, Leone Ginzburg, had founded together with 
Giulio Einaudi. I was shaped by the books brought out by this publishing house 
(which for many years then published mine as well). I will give just one example. 
With a significant and carefully pondered decision, the leader of  the Italian 
Communist Party, Palmiro Togliatti, entrusted to Einaudi (not a Communist 
publishing house, though close to the party) the publication of  the writings of  
Antonio Gramsci. For me, as for many others of  my generation, the encounter with 
Gramsci’s writings (Letters from Prison, The Prison Notebooks) was decisive.  
As is known, the Italian Communist Party, while drawing its historic legitimacy 
from the October Revolution, had a history that was at once interwoven with and 
distinct from the Soviet one. I am recalling this here because I feel I should clarify (to 
myself, and to my interlocutors) what, in my formation, is derived from intellectual 
traditions different to those close to or associated with the Communist Party. And 
the word that immediately comes to mind here is “anomaly”. 
Internal party discipline, and the search for alliances outside the party, meant that 
what might be defined as minority or anomalous intellectual views, and anomaly 
itself  as a research theme, were not viewed with favour. The impulse towards 
anomaly that has marked, for better or worse, the trajectory of  my research, must 
have another origin. Among my childhood memories is the one when I found out, 
during the war and in a moment of  great danger, that my surname had to be 
                                                 




Cromohs 18/2013 - p. 131 
concealed.9 Might the awareness of  being Jewish, and therefore different, have 
subsequently led me to focus in my research on anomalies? 
4. “Le moi est haïssable”: Pascal’s famous words sound truer than ever in an age 
of  uncontrolled narcissism such as our own. Reflecting on one’s ego is justified 
insofar as it helps to build the relationship with the outside, with the world. It is very 
often an asymmetrical relationship, modelled by what we know, and also by the 
weight of  past history (which holds good for everyone, not just historians). 
Overturning the centuries-long burden of  colonial oppression is difficult, as the 
historians of  the Subaltern Studies group (who, in their first phase, were inspired 
precisely by Gramsci) are well aware. At the beginning of  Provincializing Europe, 
Dipesh Chakrabarthy acknowledged an inerasable debt towards the categories 
elaborated by the Enlightenment, in the very moment in which he stressed their 
ambiguities.10 Reducing what Chakrabarthy calls “asymmetric ignorance” is right (as 
Giovanni Tarantino recalls), but insufficient. The elements of  contrast, beginning 
with those that pertain to the Enlightenment tradition, remain. It is a vital, lively 
contrast, which, hopefully, will last for a long time.  
5. I have not answered Lucio Biasiori’s question about the possibility of  using the 
fortunes of  an author to analyse the writings of  that author (in the given instance, 
Machiavelli), because I am currently writing an essay on this theme. I have not 
answered Giovanni Tarantino’s question “Does human nature exist?,” because I will 
never be capable of  writing anything adequate on this theme. I once answered the 
question with a “yes,” and I would do the same again. But it is only the beginning of  
an answer. The rest is up to others. 
                                                 
9 S. Hendler, “Of  Honor and Shame,” Haaretz (Nov. 19, 2010) 
(http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/of-honor-and-shame-1.325590): 
“‘The most important thing for me was that I had to change my name.’ During the war, he [C. G.] 
continues, his maternal grandmother ‘who was the only “non-Jew” in the family,’ warned him not to 
reveal his family name, Ginzburg: ‘If  asked for your name, say it is Carlo Tanzi’” (Carlo Tanzi was my 
grand-grandfather).  
10 D. Chakrabarthy, Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton 2000), 
pp. 4–5.  
